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Jafan 6/9 manual

Version: 89.39.1
Date: 04 May 2016
Filesize: 0.432 MB
Operating system: Windows XP, Visa, Windows 7,8,10 (32 & 64 bits)

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Document Downloads ICD 705.7 Technical Specifications for Construction and Management of SCIFs Jafan 6/9 Joint Air Force, Army, Navy Manual NISPOMNational Industrial Security Program Operating Manual UFC Planning Design Within The US and Overseas� � 4. CONSTRUCTION SPECIFICATIONS�.1 Vault Construction Criteria.2 SCIF Criteria For Permanent Dry Wall Construction�.3 SCIF Construction Criteria For Steel Plate.4 SCIF Construction Criteria For Expanded Metal.5 General. 5. GLOSSARY� ANNEX A - SCIF Accreditation Checklist� ANNEX B - Intrusion Detection Systems ( IDS) ANNEX C - Tactical Operations/ Field Training�     PART I - Ground Operation.   PART II - Aircraft/ Airborne Operation.     PART III - Shipboard Operation. ANNEX D�   PART I - Electronic Equipment in Sensitive Compartmented Facilities ( SCIFs)�   PART II - Disposal of Laser Toner Cartridges� ANNEX E - Acoustical Control and Sound Masking Techniques� ANNEX F - Personnel Access Controls� ANNEX G - Telecommunications Systems and Equipment� PREFACE: DCID 6/9, Physical.
This document totally lacks substantial ethical, political and/or diplomatic significance. Its basically a how to guide to building secure facilities.- Wanna Be ANerd 02:27, ( GMT) JAFAN 6-9: Nothing Special Commentor's background: US Military Police, with supervisory experience in Physical Security The thrust of this document is detailed requirements for construction of facilities where secret documents and equipment can be handled with reduced security procedures. If the environment is secure enough, the procedures within the facility are much more relaxed and efficient. Handling such material in a less secure environment is very time consuming and labor intensive. The primary value in keeping this particular JAFAN secret is simply a matter trying to keep in the dark anyone considering ways to break into such places. Knowing the thickness of iron plating, or of the reinforced concrete, and similar details about windows and entrances would presumably save the attacker some time trying to case the structure. Further, anyone having seen such a facility under construction would easily deduce the nature of its intended use, thus, whether it was worth further investigation. A significant factor in the design of SAPFs is to make surreptitious intrusions impossible. It's hard to hide the use of equipment likely to breach the structure. What such documents in this do not say, but imply, is the greatest weakness in security remains with the humans involved. I cannot count the number of times I was exposed to information and other secrets I should never have know about. During my time in uniform, people with decades of experience and training in these matters still dropped their guard simply because I was armed and supposedly on their side. Friendships and romance are the weakest link in any security structure, as the whole system militates against our humanity. Given.
For Official Use Only DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE 6/3 PROTECTING SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION WITHIN INFORMATION SYSTEMS MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 INTRODUCTION 1. A  Purpose and Content 1. B  Applicability 1. C  Administration 1. D  Background 1. E  System Information Collection 1. F  How To Use This Manual 1. G  Use of Cryptography 1. H  General Notes 2 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 2. A  Overview 2. A.1  Separation of Roles 2. A.2  Applicability 2. B  Roles and Responsibilities 2. B.1  Special Provision for Waivers of Citizenship Requirements. 2. B.2  Principal Accrediting Authority 2. B.3  Data Owner 2. B.4  Designated Accrediting Authority 2. B.5  Designated Accrediting Authority Representative ( DAA Rep) 2. B.6  Information System Security Manager ( ISSM) 2. B.7  Information System Security Officer ( ISSO) 2. B.8  Privileged Users 2. B.9  General Users 3 LEVELS- OF- CONCERN AND PROTECTION LEVELS 3. A  Overview 3. A.1  Conformance with technical security requirements 3. A.2  Non- Multi- User Systems 3. B  Description of Levels-of- Concern 3. B.1  Overview 3. B.2  Determining the Level-of- Concern 3. C  Protection Levels 3. C.1  Protection Level Overview 3. C.2  Determining Protection Levels 3. D  Determining Security Features and Assurances 4 CONFIDENTIALITY SYSTEM SECURITY FEATURES AND ASSURANCES 4. A  Overview 4. B  Confidentiality Requirements 4. B.1  Protection Level 1 4. B.2  Protection Level 2 4. B.3  Protection Level 3 4. B.4  Protection Level 4 4. B.5  Protection Level 5 5 INTEGRITY SYSTEM SECURITY FEATURES AND ASSURANCES 5. A  Overview 5. B  Integrity Requirements 5. B.1  Integrity - Basic 5. B.2  Integrity - Medium 5. B.3  Integrity - High 6 AVAILABILITY SYSTEM SECURITY FEATURES AND ASSURANCES 6. A  Overview 6. B  Availability Requirements 6. B.1  Availability - Basic 6. B.2  Availability - Medium.

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